Strategic response to pollution taxes in supply chain networks: dynamic, spatial, and organizational dimensions
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.036zbMath1317.91014OpenAlexW2090598677MaRDI QIDQ2356098
Robert D. Weaver, Sung Hoon Chung, Terry L. Friesz
Publication date: 28 July 2015
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.036
dynamic gamesustainable supply chaindifferential variational inequalitiesnonlinear complementary problemnetwork oligopolies
Variational inequalities (49J40) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Numerical methods for variational inequalities and related problems (65K15)
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