Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities.
DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00055-4zbMATH Open1039.91050OpenAlexW2102607193MaRDI QIDQ1395618FDOQ1395618
Authors: Amyaz A. Moledina, Jay S. Coggins, Stephen Polasky, Christopher Costello 
Publication date: 1 July 2003
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00055-4
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cited In (18)
- Dynamic taxes and quotas with learning
- Prices versus quantities: stock pollution control with repeated choice of the instrument
- Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
- Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework
- Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits
- Environmental regulation, technological diversity, and the dynamics of technological change
- Optimal allocation of tradable emission permits under upstream-downstream strategic interaction
- Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments
- Cheap talk, gullibility, and welfare in an environmental taxation game
- Markets for emission permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis
- Evolutionary game research on government regulation and enterprise production behavior under reward and punishment mechanism
- Emissions control policies under uncertainty and rational learning in a linear-state dynamic model
- The optimal size of a permit market
- Emission taxes and standards in a general equilibrium with entry and exit
- Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation
- AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
- Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms
- Strategic response to pollution taxes in supply chain networks: dynamic, spatial, and organizational dimensions
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