Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00055-4MaRDI QIDQ1395618zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amyaz A. Moledina, Jay S. Coggins, Stephen Polasky, Christopher Costello

Publication date 1 July 2003

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00055-4

zbMATH Keywords

DynamicsEmissions permitsEmissions taxesEnvironmental policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(20)

• Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits
• Emission taxes and standards in a general equilibrium with entry and exit
• Using automatic tax changes to control pollution emissions
• Strategic response to pollution taxes in supply chain networks: dynamic, spatial, and organizational dimensions
• Prices versus quantities: stock pollution control with repeated choice of the instrument
• Cheap talk, gullibility, and welfare in an environmental taxation game
• AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
• Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments
• Emissions control policies under uncertainty and rational learning in a linear-state dynamic model
• Markets for emission permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis
• Optimal allocation of tradable emission permits under upstream-downstream strategic interaction
• Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework
• Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms
• The optimal size of a permit market
• Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation
• Environmental regulation, technological diversity, and the dynamics of technological change
• Evolutionary game research on government regulation and enterprise production behavior under reward and punishment mechanism
• Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
• Optimal goods production subject to emissions trading with price floor
• Dynamic taxes and quotas with learning

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