Prices versus quantities: stock pollution control with repeated choice of the instrument

DOI10.1016/J.CAM.2005.11.011MaRDI QIDQ2433764zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marc Germain, A. P. Magnus

Publication date 30 October 2006

Published in Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2005.11.011

zbMATH Keywords

Pollution controltaxes versus permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Review text

This paper is concerned with strategies of pollution control through choices between taxes and tradable permits, supposed to be decided at several time periods. At each of these time periods, the choice depends on the solution of a dynamic programming problem involving the expectations of the polluting factor of production function and the pollutant stock function. According to coefficients of these two functions in the dynamic problem, it is shown under a broad functional setting that permits are decided for a while, followed by decisions of taxes for all the remaining periods. Finite as well as infinite horizon are considered.

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53693 (Why is no real title available?)
• Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty.

Cited in

(11)

• Environmental policy for spatial and persistent pollutants
• Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits
• Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities.
• Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty.
• Price volatility and risk exposure: on market-based environmental policy instruments
• Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation
• Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
• Paying for Pollution: Permits and Charges
• Pollution control by options trading
• Optimal growth with pollution: how to use pollution permits?
• Control of accumulating stock pollution by heterogeneous producers

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