Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1318zbMATH Open1169.91418OpenAlexW1519649402MaRDI QIDQ3394945FDOQ3394945

Authors: Henrik Vetter 

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art17

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (4)

• Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits
• Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.

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