Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
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Publication:1398339
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(14)- A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing
- Stochastic pollution, permits, and merger incentives
- Optimal pollution permit endowments in markets with endogenous emissions.
- Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
- Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
- Nonlinear dynamic pollution under uncertainty and binding targets
- Prices versus quantities: stock pollution control with repeated choice of the instrument
- Monetary emissions trading mechanisms
- Temporal flexibility of permit trading when pollutants are correlated
- Firm behaviour under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints
- Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information
- Pollution control by options trading
- Environmental safety stock: the impacts of regulatory and voluntary control policies on production planning, inventory control, and environmental performance
- An optional permit system for global pollution control
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