Temporal flexibility of permit trading when pollutants are correlated
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Recommendations
- Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information
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Cites work
- A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing
- An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
- Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
- Interactive pollutants and joint abatement costs: achieving water quality standards with effluent charges
- Optimal abatement in dynamic multi-pollutant problems when pollutants can be complements or substitutes
Cited in
(4)- Games with adaptation and mitigation
- An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
- Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
- Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information
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