Monetary emissions trading mechanisms
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Publication:4584805
DOI10.1111/IJET.12075zbMATH Open1398.91471OpenAlexW3122917853MaRDI QIDQ4584805FDOQ4584805
Authors: Cyril Monnet, Ted Temzelides 
Publication date: 4 September 2018
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/91323
Recommendations
- Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
- Market design for emission trading schemes
- A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing
- Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
- The endogenous price dynamics of emission allowances and an application to CO\(_2\) option pricing
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Trade models (91B60)
Cited In (23)
- Overlapping efforts in the EU Emissions Trading System
- Temporal flexibility of permit trading when pollutants are correlated
- Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?
- A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
- Markets for emission permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis
- Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction
- Market design for emission trading schemes
- An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
- Growth and irreversible pollution: are emission permits a means of avoiding environmental and poverty traps?
- The optimal size of a permit market
- Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information
- Flexibility premium of emissions permits
- Optimal growth with pollution: how to use pollution permits?
- Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement
- Tradable fuel economy credits: competition and oligopoly
- Optimal mix of emissions taxes and cap-and-trade
- Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
- The environment as a factor of production
- Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
- Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
- Emissions trading with rolling horizons
- Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating
- The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
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