Monetary emissions trading mechanisms

DOI10.1111/IJET.12075MaRDI QIDQ4584805zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cyril Monnet, Ted Temzelides

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1911/91323

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policyemissions tradingclimatepermits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
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Cited in

(23)

• Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
• Markets for emission permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis
• Flexibility premium of emissions permits
• An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
• Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement
• Overlapping efforts in the EU Emissions Trading System
• Optimal growth with pollution: how to use pollution permits?
• The optimal size of a permit market
• Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?
• Emissions trading with rolling horizons
• A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
• Growth and irreversible pollution: are emission permits a means of avoiding environmental and poverty traps?
• Tradable fuel economy credits: competition and oligopoly
• The environment as a factor of production
• Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking.
• Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information
• Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating
• Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
• Optimal mix of emissions taxes and cap-and-trade
• Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction
• The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
• Market design for emission trading schemes
• Temporal flexibility of permit trading when pollutants are correlated

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