Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_8MaRDI QIDQ5111105zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John O. Ledyard

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/99370/

zbMATH Keywords

imprecise measurementtradable permit system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
• Monetary emissions trading mechanisms
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

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