Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_8zbMATH Open1443.91169OpenAlexW2947478351MaRDI QIDQ5111105FDOQ5111105

Authors: John O. Ledyard 

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/99370/

Recommendations

• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
• Monetary emissions trading mechanisms
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

zbMATH Keywords

imprecise measurementtradable permit system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

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