scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724

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Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
On the informational efficiency of the competitive resource allocation process
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
A fuzzy preference relation in the vector maximum problem
Decentralization in infinite horizon economies: An introduction
Control of linear dynamic market systems
Optimal intertemporal allocation mechanisms and decentralization of decisions
On characterizing optimality of stochastic competitive processes
A dictionary for voting paradoxes
Conflicting interests, decomposability and comparative statics
Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control
Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
On the size of the message space under non-convexities
Decentralized dynamic processes for finding equilibrium
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
Some aspects of effectively constructive mathematics that are relevant to the foundations of neoclassical mathematical economics and the theory of games
Nonlocal variational theory and optimal control problems
On the periodic coordination of linear stochastic systems
Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
On efficiency and Pareto optimality of competitive programs in closed multisector models
Closed images of convex multivalued mappings in linear topological spaces with applications
Decentralized control problems in Neumann-economies
Expectations equilibrium and informational efficiency for stochastic environments
A generalization of the Farkas lemma and applications to convex programming
The sampling distribution of forecasts from a first-order autoregression
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
The representation of shadow values in resource allocation teams
On the communication complexity of expected-profit maximization
Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
Duality theory for infinite-dimensional multiobjective linear programming
An infinite dimensional extension of the theory of decentralized mechanisms
On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
Concepts of proper efficiency
Monte Carlo methodology and the small sample behaviour of ordinary and two-stage least squares
Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
Closed forms for asymptotic bias and variance in autoregressive models with unit roots
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Inductive reasoning in social choice theory
Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters
A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism
Introduction to computer science and economic theory
Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion
Self-enforcing protocols via co-utile reputation management
Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
An axiomatic characterization of the price-money message mechanism for economies with satiation
Competitive markets with private information on both sides
The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem
The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production
Supportably and weakly convex functionals with applications to approximation theory and nonlinear programming
Linear equations and inequalities on finite dimensional, real or complex, vector spaces: a unified theory
Uniform approximation of nonnegative continuous linear functionals
Comonotonic proper scoring rules to measure ambiguity and subjective beliefs
A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
On liberal values
Communication and efficiency in auctions
Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
Asking questions
Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement
Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
Implementation theory
Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
Implementation by mediated equilibrium
Asymptotic properties of a Leontief economy
Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
A theory of value with nonlinear prices. Equilibrium analysis beyond vector lattices
Computational implementation
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a locally stable message process
Automaton and group structures in certain economic adjustment mechanisms
A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
On the design of complex organizations and distributive algorithms
Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

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