The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
The author raises the question of: What behavior, if any, can be explained as the Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of some game? The answer provided by the author is that almost any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. He shows, in particular, that given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies, there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the transformed game. One of the conclusions he arrives at as a result of his analyses is that only if one places some (severe) a priori restrictions on the functional forms of utilities and priors, that one gets meaningful restrictions on behavior. The author also comments that his conclusions are similar to those, from Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which apply to aggregate excess demand functions. They do not, however, imply that the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium has no content; rather that it is only the combination of assumptions on utilities, priors, and equilibrium which jointly provide meaningful implication.
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Optimal Auction Design
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games
- The subjective expected utility hypothesis and revealed preference
- The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Bayesian-Nash equilibria in theory of planned behaviour
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard
- Comment on ``Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics
- Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
This page was built for publication: The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1085080)
