The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90020-7MaRDI QIDQ1085080zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John O. Ledyard

Publication date 1986

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81585/

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumBayes equilibrium behaviortransformed game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

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• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Auction Design
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes

Cited in

(14)

• Bayesian-Nash equilibria in theory of planned behaviour
• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Comment on ``Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics
• Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis
• The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• Identification of payoffs in repeated games
• An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
• The subjective expected utility hypothesis and revealed preference
• Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard

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