A Bayesian equilibrium existence theorem
Spaces of measurable functions ((L^p)-spaces, Orlicz spaces, Köthe function spaces, Lorentz spaces, rearrangement invariant spaces, ideal spaces, etc.) (46E30) Limit theorems for vector-valued random variables (infinite-dimensional case) (60B12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)
Explaining carefully Bayesian abstract economies and Bayesian equilibria the existence of such an equilibrium is proved for a countable set of agents (players) under certain assumptions. This theorem generalizes earlier results of Nash, Debreu, and also the author [compare \textit{N. C. Yannelis}, ``On the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in Functional analysis and economic theory, 291--296 (1998; Zbl 0914.90037)]. The paper is very well readable since it starts describing the difficulties in order to generalize the earlier results, recalls shortly the used theorems for the proof (e.g., Aumann measurable selection, theorems on weak compactness, projection theorem in measure spaces), and finally gives concluding remarks comparing his result and the used methods with earlier ones. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1029.00019].
- Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Bayesian general equilibrium
- Bayesian abstract economies
- On the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Equilibria existence in Bayesian games: climbing the countable Borel equivalence relation hierarchy
- On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
- On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
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