Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
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(37)- Using bid data for the management of sequential, multi-unit, online auctions with uniformly distributed bidder valuations
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with variable awards
- A learning approach to auctions
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- An optimal auction for complements
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
- On the regulation of procurement bids
- Ordering sellers in sequential auctions
- Exponential regression of fractional-response fixed-effects models with an application to firm capital structure
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory
- Upgrade auctions in build-to-order manufacturing with loss-averse customers
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
- Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
- A multiunit generalization of a first price auction
- Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: asymmetric cost and incomplete information
- Premium auctions and risk preferences
- Seller surplus in first price auctions
- Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- Priority search with outside options
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Strong convergence of monotone hybrid method for fixed point iteration processes
- Optimal starting price for eBay-like online auctions
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Auctions with entry
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
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