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Publication:654516
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3297399 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3337815 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Auctions with entry
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly?
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
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