Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price

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Publication:1972849

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0704zbMath0938.91001OpenAlexW2105173236MaRDI QIDQ1972849

Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico

Publication date: 25 June 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0704



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