Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.07.002MaRDI QIDQ2455656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David McAdams

Publication date 26 October 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenessall-pay auctioninterdependent valuesfirst-price auctionaffiliation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• First price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
• On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49608 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3337815 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
• Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment
• Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
• Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
• Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
• The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions

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