Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
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Publication:2455656
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.07.002zbMATH Open1256.91023OpenAlexW2143502829MaRDI QIDQ2455656FDOQ2455656
Authors: David McAdams 
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941
Recommendations
- Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
- Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- First price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (9)
- Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment
- Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
- Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
- The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
- On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
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