Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.006zbMath1138.91406MaRDI QIDQ2507856

Bernard Lebrun

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution, Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders, Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions, Asymmetric first price auctions, Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

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