All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
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Publication:1421904
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2zbMath1059.91025DBLPjournals/jet/BlumeH04OpenAlexW2128790636WikidataQ56658230 ScholiaQ56658230MaRDI QIDQ1421904
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00104-2
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
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