Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
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Publication:700092
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0879zbMATH Open1013.91043OpenAlexW3121869879MaRDI QIDQ700092FDOQ700092
Authors: Sushil Bikhchandani, Philip Haile, John G. Riley 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/090663ed64fd1ec96a5185e701a18c9fcca11352
Recommendations
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- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games.
Cites Work
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
Cited In (18)
- Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
- Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
- Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
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