Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
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Publication:700092
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0879zbMath1013.91043OpenAlexW3121869879MaRDI QIDQ700092
Philip A. Haile, John G. Riley, Sushil Bikhchandani
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/090663ed64fd1ec96a5185e701a18c9fcca11352
Related Items (10)
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature ⋮ Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
Cites Work
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
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