Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0879MaRDI QIDQ700092zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sushil Bikhchandani, Philip Haile, John G. Riley

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/090663ed64fd1ec96a5185e701a18c9fcca11352

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaEnglish auctionsperfect Bayesian equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
• Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
• First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games.

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding

Cited in

(18)

• Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
• Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
• Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
• Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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