An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
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Publication:406416
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.07.014zbMATH Open1309.91068OpenAlexW3121348236MaRDI QIDQ406416FDOQ406416
Yuanchuan Lien, Jacob K. Goeree
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/99570/2/0B2gZChEx0Cn_ZjRWOTE5VURIdFE.pdf
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Cites Work
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Order Statistics
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
- Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra.
- Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games.
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
- Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
Cited In (13)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
- On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction
- On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods
- A New Analysis of Expected Revenue
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
- A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
- Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
- Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions
- Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests
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