Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2276559
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.002zbMATH Open1250.91054OpenAlexW2076345406MaRDI QIDQ2276559FDOQ2276559
Authors: Charles Z. Zheng
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p3860-2006-11-16.pdf
Recommendations
complementarityauctionsynergyexposure problemsimultaneous auctionsmultiple object auctionsthreshold problem
Cites Work
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
- Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
- Collusion via resale
- A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Cited In (5)
This page was built for publication: Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2276559)