Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
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Publication:1367775
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0093zbMATH Open0886.90056OpenAlexW2087831211MaRDI QIDQ1367775FDOQ1367775
Robert W. Rosenthal, Ruqu Wang
Publication date: 19 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0093
Cited In (16)
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra.
- Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games.
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods
- TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS
- Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
- A change in the timing of auctions with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior
- Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
- On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
- Auctions with synergy and resale
- Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions
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