Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra.

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Publication:1408644

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00530-4zbMath1057.91035WikidataQ60680562 ScholiaQ60680562MaRDI QIDQ1408644

Robert W. Rosenthal, Balázs Szentes

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)




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