Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
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Publication:1003098
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8zbMath1155.91361OpenAlexW2162271938MaRDI QIDQ1003098
Giuseppe Lopomo, George Sandro Brusco
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8
Related Items (12)
Pricing in position auctions and online advertising ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints ⋮ Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders ⋮ Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
Cites Work
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