A simple model of coalitional bidding

DOI10.1007/S001990000153zbMATH Open1026.91040OpenAlexW1984076143MaRDI QIDQ699012FDOQ699012

Authors: In-Koo Cho, Kevin Jewell, Rajiv Vohra 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990000153

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zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscollusionauctionsjoint bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (5)

• Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
• Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions

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