Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0709-zzbMath1319.91088MaRDI QIDQ361828

Sumit Joshi, Poorvi L. Vora

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0709-z

zbMATH Keywords

dominant groups; private value auctions; stars and interlinked stars; strong rings; weak rings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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