Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings

DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0709-ZzbMATH Open1319.91088OpenAlexW2027236350MaRDI QIDQ361828FDOQ361828

Authors: Sumit Joshi, Poorvi L. Vora 

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0709-z

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zbMATH Keywords

dominant groupsprivate value auctionsstars and interlinked starsstrong ringsweak rings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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Cited In (2)

• Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

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