Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
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Publication:1266864
DOI10.1007/s001990050220zbMath0911.90129OpenAlexW1987768043MaRDI QIDQ1266864
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Charles M. Kahn
Publication date: 13 October 1998
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050220
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