Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.07.004zbMATH Open1122.91031OpenAlexW2097988585MaRDI QIDQ815212FDOQ815212

Dan Levin, John H. Kagel

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentauctionsynergiesexposure problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Optimal Auction Design
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

Cited In (5)

• On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Survival auctions
• Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
• Auctions with synergy and resale

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