Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.002zbMath1161.91370OpenAlexW2104473187MaRDI QIDQ1021594

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmulti-unit auctionsmechanism designdynamic Vickrey (Ausubel) auctionstatic Vickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Survival auctions, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions, Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis, Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets, Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization, Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

Cites Work

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• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction