Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1021594
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.002zbMath1161.91370OpenAlexW2104473187MaRDI QIDQ1021594
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.002
implementationmulti-unit auctionsmechanism designdynamic Vickrey (Ausubel) auctionstatic Vickrey auction
Related Items
Survival auctions, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions, Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis, Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets, Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization, Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
Cites Work
- Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
- Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Framing the first-price auction
- Survival auctions
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction