Framing the first-price auction

DOI10.1007/s10683-006-9130-4zbMath1161.91379OpenAlexW1978751536MaRDI QIDQ2642606

Raymond C. Battalio, Theodore L. Turocy, Elizabeth Watson

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9130-4

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsIsomorphismFirst-price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents

Cites Work

• Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets

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