Survival auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0156-9MaRDI QIDQ2642883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John H. Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Lixin Ye

Publication date 6 September 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9

zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionAusubel auctionMulti-unit demand auctionSurvival auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

Cited in

(5)

• Fear of losing in a clock auction
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Prices versus auctions in large markets

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