Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions

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Publication:2486156

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002zbMath1115.91023OpenAlexW1985034397MaRDI QIDQ2486156

Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002




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