Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback

DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9166-0zbMath1140.91356OpenAlexW1997913516MaRDI QIDQ934687

Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote

Publication date: 30 July 2008

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9166-0

zbMATH Keywords

LearningRisk aversionExperimental economicsBidding theoryFirst-price sealed-bid auctionsIndependent private value model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation ⋮ Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game ⋮ Revealed preference analysis of expected utility maximization under prize-probability trade-offs ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Learning direction theory and the winner's curse
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
• Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions