Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9378-ZzbMATH Open1273.91215OpenAlexW2158010925MaRDI QIDQ368056FDOQ368056
Authors: Tibor Neugebauer, Sascha Füllbrunn 
Publication date: 18 September 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2066/112206
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
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- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
- `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
- Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
- The two-person beauty contest
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
- Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom: A graphical analysis
- Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs
Cited In (6)
- The effect of competition on risk taking in contests
- The value of a fallback option
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation
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