Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3zbMATH Open1273.91209OpenAlexW2009430463MaRDI QIDQ374816FDOQ374816

Authors: James C. Cox, Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker 

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3

Recommendations

• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions
• Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
• On the efficiency of the first price auction
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders

Cited In (19)

• English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
• Experiments on auctions with random prizes and EU/non-EU bidders
• Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding
• Informed entry in auctions
• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
• Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a right-of-first-refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental evidence
• Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• The discrete bid first auction
• Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction
• Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory
• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments

This page was built for publication: Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q374816)