Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3MaRDI QIDQ374816zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James C. Cox, Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker

Publication date 24 October 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
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• Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
• On the efficiency of the first price auction
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Cites work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders

Cited in

(19)

• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
• English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
• Experiments on auctions with random prizes and EU/non-EU bidders
• Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding
• Informed entry in auctions
• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
• Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a right-of-first-refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental evidence
• Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• The discrete bid first auction
• Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction
• Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory

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