On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.010zbMATH Open1297.91084OpenAlexW2131446015MaRDI QIDQ403716FDOQ403716

Authors: Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010

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zbMATH Keywords

differentiationmechanism designprocurementasymmetric auctionsfirst price auctionsrequest for proposalrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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Cited In (17)

• Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
• Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
• Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

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