On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
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Publication:403716
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010zbMath1297.91084OpenAlexW2131446015MaRDI QIDQ403716
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Vlad Mares
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010
differentiationmechanism designasymmetric auctionsprocurementfirst price auctionsrequest for proposalrho-concavitysecond price auctions
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