On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.010MaRDI QIDQ403716zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

differentiationmechanism designprocurementasymmetric auctionsfirst price auctionsrequest for proposalrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(17)

• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
• Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch

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