Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2022.2349zbMATH Open1505.90009OpenAlexW3182241532MaRDI QIDQ5060486FDOQ5060486

Authors: Qi Chen, Damian R. Beil, Izak Duenyas 

Publication date: 10 January 2023

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2349

Recommendations

• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts
• The Buyer's procuring mechanism under operating cost sharing in supply chain
• Bidding for Contests
• An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprocurementoptimal mechanismfirst-pricesealed-bid auctionwin-wincost-reduction investigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

• Multistage Games with Communication
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• RFQ auctions with supplier qualification screening
• Dynamic cost reduction through process improvement in assembly networks
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production
• The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
• Whether or not to open Pandora's box
• Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality
• “Now or Later?” When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing
• The Strategic Benefit of Request for Proposal/Quotation

Cited In (1)

• The Buyer's procuring mechanism under operating cost sharing in supply chain

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