Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00301-3zbMath0984.91031MaRDI QIDQ1583272

Roland Strausz, Helmut Bester

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00301-3

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; mechanism design; revelation principle; limited commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B14: Social choice

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Cites Work

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement