Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.06.039MaRDI QIDQ320139zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aadhaar Chaturvedi

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039

zbMATH Keywords

auctions/biddingasymmetric auctionspurchasing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• Capacity games with supply function competition

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Cited in

(18)

• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• E-sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Noncompetitive Contracts
• Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory
• \textit{Ex ante} and \textit{ex post} subcontracting between two competing bidders
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
• Renewable auctions: bidding for real options
• First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities
• Auctioning bulk mobile messages
• Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data
• Capacitated procurement planning with price-sensitive demand and general concave-revenue functions
• A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints
• Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings
• Bilevel approach for e-bidding auction with regret theory
• Revenue deficiency under second-price auctions in a supply-chain setting
• Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders

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