Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders
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Recommendations
- \textit{Ex ante} and \textit{ex post} subcontracting between two competing bidders
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
- Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
- An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities
Cites work
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Better, faster, cheaper: an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- How to subcontract?
- Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- The all-pay auction with complete information
Cited in
(5)- How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions
- The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
- \textit{Ex ante} and \textit{ex post} subcontracting between two competing bidders
- Manufacturing and procurement outsourcing strategies of competing original equipment manufacturers
- Assessing mergers and budget constraint in multiple-unit ICT procurements -- \textit{the cooperation/competition dilemma}
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