The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
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Publication:2424777
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.003zbMath1431.91169OpenAlexW2940032400WikidataQ128013708 ScholiaQ128013708MaRDI QIDQ2424777
Gian-Marco Kokott, Per Paulsen, Martin Bichler
Publication date: 25 June 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.003
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (3)
How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions ⋮ Block sourcing plus
Cites Work
- Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
- Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
- Pricing in multiple-item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost
- Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders
- Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
- Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale
- Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units
- A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Optimal Auction Design
- Coordination in Split Award Auctions
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