The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.003zbMath1431.91169OpenAlexW2940032400WikidataQ128013708 ScholiaQ128013708MaRDI QIDQ2424777

Gian-Marco Kokott, Per Paulsen, Martin Bichler

Publication date: 25 June 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

auctionssupply chain managementpurchasingbiddingsplit-award auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions ⋮ Block sourcing plus

Cites Work

• Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
• Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
• Pricing in multiple-item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost
• Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders
• Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
• Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale
• Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units
• A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Optimal Auction Design
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions

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