Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory
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Publication:1753650
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2017.03.024zbMATH Open1403.91185DBLPjournals/eor/WangG17OpenAlexW2596439313WikidataQ57597768 ScholiaQ57597768MaRDI QIDQ1753650FDOQ1753650
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.024
decision support systemsbehavioral modelsauctions/biddingone-shot decision theorythrowing away/overbidding
Cites Work
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Cited In (16)
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- A bilevel optimization model for the newsvendor problem with the focus theory of choice
- Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
- A survey of decision making and optimization under uncertainty
- Focus theory of choice and its application to resolving the St. Petersburg, Allais, and Ellsberg paradoxes and other anomalies
- Dynamic focus programming: a new approach to sequential decision problems under uncertainty
- Single-level reformulations of a specific non-smooth bilevel programming problem and their applications
- Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
- Focus programming: a bi‐level programming approach to static stochastic optimization problems
- Bilevel approach for e-bidding auction with regret theory
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Approaches to four types of bilevel programming problems with nonconvex nonsmooth lower level programs and their applications to newsvendor problems
- Optimal Design of Online Sequential Buy-Price Auctions with Consumer Valuation Learning
- Bilevel programming approaches to production planning for multiple products with short life cycles
- A game-theory model of a one-sided auction
- What causes post-decision disappointment? Estimating the contributions of systematic and selection biases
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