Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory
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Publication:1753650
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3135430 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approaches to multistage one-shot decision making
- Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
- First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Multi-attribute online reverse auctions: recent research trends
- Newsvendor models for innovative products with one-shot decision theory
- Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
- On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions
- On optimal bidding and inventory control in sequential procurement auctions: the multi period case
- On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
Cited in
(18)- Single-level reformulations of a specific non-smooth bilevel programming problem and their applications
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Dynamic focus programming: a new approach to sequential decision problems under uncertainty
- Step-level reasoning and bidding in auctions
- Optimal design of online sequential buy-price auctions with consumer valuation learning
- Focus theory of choice and its application to resolving the St. Petersburg, Allais, and Ellsberg paradoxes and other anomalies
- A bilevel optimization model for the newsvendor problem with the focus theory of choice
- Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
- Approaches to four types of bilevel programming problems with nonconvex nonsmooth lower level programs and their applications to newsvendor problems
- A first-bid auction model with a fictitious buyer
- Bilevel programming approaches to production planning for multiple products with short life cycles
- Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
- A game-theory model of a one-sided auction
- Focus programming: a bi‐level programming approach to static stochastic optimization problems
- What causes post-decision disappointment? Estimating the contributions of systematic and selection biases
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Bilevel approach for e-bidding auction with regret theory
- A survey of decision making and optimization under uncertainty
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