Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.015zbMath1282.91078OpenAlexW3122595982MaRDI QIDQ2437823

Peter McGee

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.015

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsauction feveruncertain values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Revisiting risk aversion: can risk preferences change with experience? ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Disappointment aversion in internet bidding-decisions
• Just who are you calling risk averse?
• Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
• A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*

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