Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-ZMaRDI QIDQ1676648zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel A. Graham, Robert C. Marshall, Jean-Francois Richard

Publication date 9 November 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• More on phantom bidding
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Buy-price auction: a distributional approach
• Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(8)

• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• More on phantom bidding
• Shills and snipes
• Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
• A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

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