Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0566-6MaRDI QIDQ431213zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Itai Sher

Publication date 26 June 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncombinatorial auctionsshill biddingVCG mechanismwinner determination problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Bidder collusion
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Combinatorial auctions
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Cotenancy and competition in an experimental auction market for natural gas pipeline networks
• Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
• More on phantom bidding
• Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
• Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Submodular functions and optimization.
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

(5)

• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
• Auctions with shill bidding
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions

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