Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.08.005MaRDI QIDQ543608zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Publication date 17 June 2011

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/426398/1/1_s2.0_S0004370210001438_main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsmechanism designrevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial games (91A46) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
• On revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Combinatorial auction design
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
• Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
• Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(19)

• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
• Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions
• Diffusion auction design
• Revenue monotonicity under misspecified bidders
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

This page was built for publication: Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q543608)