Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005zbMath1214.91047OpenAlexW2142852830WikidataQ60521647 ScholiaQ60521647MaRDI QIDQ543608

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Publication date: 17 June 2011

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/426398/1/1_s2.0_S0004370210001438_main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcombinatorial auctionsrevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Combinatorial games (91A46)

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