The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
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Publication:1420521
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9zbMath1069.91039WikidataQ56443583 ScholiaQ56443583MaRDI QIDQ1420521
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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