Optimal auctions revisited

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(00)00024-2zbMath0947.68564OpenAlexW2106490842MaRDI QIDQ5915393

Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 21 August 2000

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(00)00024-2

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsMechanism designAuction design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Artificial intelligence (68T99)

Related Items (9)

Tractable combinatorial auctions and \(b\)-matching ⋮ Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions ⋮ IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION IN A THIRD-PRICE AUCTION MODEL ⋮ The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. ⋮ Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions. ⋮ On rational computability and communication complexity ⋮ Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Distributed games
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
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