On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2510113
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2014.05.008zbMath1407.91132MaRDI QIDQ2510113
Shani Alkoby, Esther David, David Sarne
Publication date: 1 August 2014
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.05.008
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Cites Work
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Preference-based English reverse auctions
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Tractable combinatorial auctions and \(b\)-matching
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- Buy-price English auction
- An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
- A Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction with Verifiable Discriminant of p 0-th Root
- A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Incentives in Teams
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
