An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2009.01.002MaRDI QIDQ835835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes

Publication date 31 August 2009

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3967323

zbMATH Keywords

optionspreferencesstrategyproofnesscoordination problemsdynamic auctionselectronic marketsproxy agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations
• Addressing the exposure problem of bidding agents using flexibly priced options
• Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
• Sequential auctions and externalities
• Ordering sellers in sequential auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966908 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach
• Online mechanisms
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The pricing of options and corporate liabilities

Cited in

(6)

• Preference-based English reverse auctions
• Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
• Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations
• Addressing the exposure problem of bidding agents using flexibly priced options
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

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