Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0831zbMath1050.91034OpenAlexW2028665643MaRDI QIDQ5938626

Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cc90d2df634c69b6af785782237a7cbd005aaa96

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingautomated negotiationbreach strategiescontingency contractseconomics of uncertaintyleveled commitment contractsmarket designmultiagent systemsnon-cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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